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Evolutionary Stability in Sender-Receiver Games with Partial Common Interest.

Blume, A. - Department of Economics, Tippie College of Business - 1995

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005819502

Equilibrium Refinement in Sender-Receiver Games.

Blume, A. - Department of Economics, Tippie College of Business - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005819515

Equilibrium Refinement in Perturbed Games and in Sender- Receiver Games.

Blume, A. - Department of Economics, Tippie College of Business - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005819519

Contract Renegotiation with Adverse Selection and Hidden Information.

Blume, A. - Department of Economics, Tippie College of Business - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005819530

Communication-Proof Equilibria in Cheap-Talk Games.

Blume, A.; Sobel, J. - Department of Economics, Tippie College of Business - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005819532

Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication.

Blume, A.; Kim, Y.G.; Sobel, J. - Department of Economics, Tippie College of Business - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755347

Renting and selling : Higher Profits from Renegotiation- Proof Rental Contracts.

Blume, A. - Department of Economics, Tippie College of Business - 1990

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755364

Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication.

Blume, A.; Kim, Y.G.; Sobel, J. - Department of Economics, Tippie College of Business - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755365

Settlement and Litigation with Multiple Defendants: The Auditor and Manager.

Blume, A.; DeJong, D.V. - Department of Economics, Tippie College of Business - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755367

Learning in Sender-Receiver Games

Blume, A.; DeJong, D.V.; Neumann, G.R.; Savin, N.E. - Department of Economics, Tippie College of Business - 1998

Stimulus-response (SR) and belief-based learning (BBL) models are estimated with experimental data from sender-receiver games and compared using the Davidson and MacKinnon P-test for non-nested hypotheses. Depending on a certain adjustment parameter, the P-test favors the SR model, the BBL model...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005560346