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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005767425
We study majority voting over a bidimensional policy space when the voters' type space is either uni- or bidimensional. We show that a Condorcet winner fails to generically exist even with a unidimensional type space. We then study two voting procedures widely used in the literature. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513109
In this paper, we lay the first building blocks of a positive theory of nation formation where national choices consist of the size and location of a public good. Individuals differ both in income and in their preferences for the public good location. Public expenditures are financed either by a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791500
This note suggests a bridge between stochastic dominance (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970 [17], 1973 [18]), inequality measurement (Atkinson, 1970 [1]) and discrimination measurement (Gastwirth, 1975 [10]). Discrimination orderings are defined and illustrated through discrimination curves, in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010572384
The main purpose of this paper is to prove that smoothness is not a restrictive assumption in inequality measurement as any inequality measure (preorder) can be approximated in a well defined sense by a smooth inequality measure (preorder).
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008870841
We study majority voting over a bidimensional policy space when the voters' type space is either uni- or bidimensional. We show that a Condorcet winner fails to generically exist even with a unidimensional type space. We then study two voting procedures widely used in the literature. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468656
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005464227
In this note, we use the technique of option sets to sort out the implications of coalitional strategyproofness in the spatial setting. We also discuss related issues and open problems.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011268411
In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to Groseclose and Snyder (1996), describing a legislature that vote over two alternatives, where two opposing lobbies compete by bidding for legislators?votes. In this model, the lobbyist moving...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011268412
The main purpose of this paper is to estimate the probability of casting a decisive vote for a class or random electorate models encompassing the celebrated IC and IAC models. The emphasis is on the impact of correlation across votes on the order of magnitude of this event. Our proof techniques...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011268420