On the example of a pure-exchange financial economy with two periods, incomplete nominal asset markets and differential information of the adverse selection's type, Cornet-De Boisdeffre (2002) introduced refined concepts of price, arbitrage and a so-called «no-arbitrage equilibrium», which...

In a general equilibrium model of incomplete markets with nominal assets and adverse selection, Cornet-De Boisdeffre (3) introduced refined concepts of " no-arbitrage " prices and equilibria, which extended to the asymmetric information. We now present the model with numeraire assets and study...

On the example of a pure-exchange financial economy with two periods, incomplete nominal-asset markets and differential information of the adverse selection's type, Cornet-De Boisdeffre (2002) introduced refined concepts of no-arbitrage prices and equilibria, which extended to the asymmetric...

In [2], we had extended the classical concepts and arbitrage theory of symmetric information, to an asymmetric information model, which dropped Radner's (1979) rational expectations' assumption. In [3], we showed how agents could infer enough information, in this model, to rule out arbitrage...

Our earlier papers had extend to asymmetric information the classical existence theorems of general equilibrium theory, under the standard assumption that agents had perfect foresights, that is, they knew, ex ante, which price would prevail on each spot market. Common observation suggests,...

Our earlier papers had extended to asymmetric information some classical existence theorems of general equilibrium theory, under the standard assumption that agents had perfect foresights, that is, they knew at the outset which price would prevail tomorrow on each spot market. Yet, observation...

In a financial economy with asymmetric information and incomplete markets, we study how agents, having no model of how equilibrium prices are determined, may still refine their information by eliminating sequentially "arbitrage state(s)", namely, the state (s) which would grant the agent an...

We consider a pure exchange financial economy, where rational agents, possibly asymmetrically informed, forecast prices privately and, therefore, face “exogenous uncertainty”, on the future state of nature, and “endogenous uncertainty” on future prices. At a sequential equilibrium, all...

We extend the Cornet-de Boisdeffre (2002-2009) asymmetric information finite dimensional model to a more general setting, where agents may forecast prices with some private uncertainty. This new model drops both Radner's (1972-1979) classical, but restrictive, assumptions of rational...

We consider a pure exchange financial economy, where rational agents, possibly asymmetrically informed, forecast prices privately and, therefore, face “exogenous uncertainty”, on the future state of nature, and “endogenous uncertainty” on future prices. At a sequential equilibrium, all...