In this paper we build on a voluntary mechanism introduced by Segerson and Wu (2006) that uses the threat of an ambient tax to induce nonpoint source polluters to reduce emissions. In addition to reviewing Segerson and Wu's policy, we propose a new voluntary/threat policy that offers some...

This article presents experimental tests of a linear and a nonlinear ambient tax mechanism that involve modest information requirements for the regulator. When agents are not allowed to communicate, both tax mechanisms result in emission levels that approximate the social optimum. When agents...

This article considers the regulation of nonpoint source water pollution through the use of a voluntary-threat approach, which allows a polluter group to meet a standard voluntarily but imposes an ambient tax upon noncompliance. In particular, we develop an "endogenous" voluntary-threat approach...

This article presents experimental tests of a linear and a nonlinear ambient tax mechanism that involve modest information requirements for the regulator. When agents are not allowed to communicate, both tax mechanisms result in emission levels that approximate the social optimum. When agents...

Over the last two decades, ambient-based tax mechanisms have been offered as a potential solution to the problem of nonpoint source water pollution. Previous theoretical analyses suggest that the performance of ambient-based tax mechanisms does not depend on firm characteristics, such as size,...

The regulation of nonpoint source water pollution from agriculture is a complex problem characterized by a multiplicity of polluters, informational asymmetries, complex fate and transport processes, and stochastic environmental factors. Taken together, these characteristics make regulatory...

This paper uses laboratory experiments to provide primary empirical evidence on dynamic pollution tax policies. In particular, we investigate a setting where a regulator with incomplete information uses a pollution tax mechanism with a simple, endogenous tax rate adjustment rule to...

This article considers whether communication can improve the efficacy of incentive mechanisms designed to correct the problem of moral hazard in groups. In particular, we use experimental economics methods to study environmental targeting instruments proposed by Segerson (1988) for regulating a...