Similar Search Results

Eliciting motives for trust and reciprocity by attitudinal and behavioural measures

Farina, Francesco; O'Higgins, Niall; Sbriglia, Patrizia - Dipartimento di Politica Economica, Finanza e Sviluppo … - 2008

The intention to “invest” in the Trust Game in extensive form revealed by a move could conceal different motivations … embedded in the trust game: 1) an “investment” motive - conditional cooperation is a way to express the expectation of … measures of trust and trustworthiness. In this paper, we will then be using the “words” of answers to a questionnaire in order …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766550

Eliciting Motives for Trust and Reciprocity by Attitudinal and Behavioural Measures

Farina, Francesco; O'Higgins, Niall; Sbriglia, Patrizia - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008

important primitives of social capital – trust and reciprocity – which can be used to explain deviations from the Nash … the behaviour of players in experimental trust and dictator games and suggest that the most informative utilization of … questionnaire about attitudes to trusting and reciprocating predict subjects’ behaviour and, by comparing behaviour in Trust and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005700904

What is trustworthiness and what drives it?

Cox, James C.; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Neururer, Daniel - Institut für Finanzwissenschaft, Fakultät für … - 2014

definitions of trust and trustworthiness based on revealed willingness to accept vulnerability and the response to it. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895184

What is Trustworthiness and What Drives It?

Cox, James C.; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Neururer, Daniel - Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy … - 2014

definitions of trust and trustworthiness based on revealed willingness to accept vulnerability and the response to it. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905947

The investment game with asymmetric information

Coricelli, G.; Morales, L.G.; Mahlstedt, A. - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft

We analyze the effects of introducing asymmetric information and expectations in the investment game (Berg et al., 1995). In our experiment, only the trustee knows the size of the surplus. Subjects’ expectations about each other’s behavior are also elicited. Our results show that average...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765175

Vendettas

Bolle, Friedel; Tan, Jonathan H.W.; Zizzo, Daniel John - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2010

Vendettas occur in many real world settings where rivals compete for a prize, e.g., winning an election or a competitive promotion, by engaging in retaliatory aggressive behavior. We present a benchmark experiment where two players have an initial probability of winning a prize. Retaliatory...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781899

Vendettas

Bolle, Friedel; Tan, Jonathan H.W.; Zizzo, Daniel John - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008592422

Trust, Communication and Contracts: An Experiment

Ben-Ner, Avner; Putterman, Louis - Center for Human Resources and Labor Studies, Carlson …

In the one-shot trust or investment game without opportunities for reputation formation or contracting, economic theory …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005456373

Does players’ identification affect trust and reciprocity in the lab?

Dubois, D.; Willinger, M.; Blayac, T. - In: Journal of Economic Psychology 33 (2012) 1, pp. 303-317

trust and reciprocity in a population where agents play both roles (trustor and trustee). Our experiment consists on three … does not affect the average trust in the population. Trust is significantly higher only when players can build up a … reputation in both roles. We show that the increase in trust is mainly linked to the formation of mutual trust …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010577290

An Extension to the Model of Inequity Aversion by Fehr and Schmidt

Ottone, Stefania; Ponzano, Ferruccio - Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS - 2005

The aim of this paper is to improve on the model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) by developing a non-linear model (that leads to interior rather than corner solutions) and by taking into account that different levels of income imply different reactions of fair-minded people. We suggest to modify the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005426872