This paper considers the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced cooperative game as a solution concept. It is shown that the Lorenz-solution concept satisfies a number of suitable properties such as desirability, continuity and the reduced game property. Moreover, the paper...

The rule of decreasing serial cost sharing defined in de Frutos [1] over the class of concave cost functions may violate the important stand-alone test. Sufficient conditions for the test to be satisfied are given, in terms of individual rationality as well as coalitional stability. These...

This paper considers generalized Lorenz-maximal solutions in the core of a convex TU-game and demonstrates that such solutions satisfy coalitional monotonicity and population monotonicity.

This paper considers generalized Lorenz-maximal solutions in the core of a convex TU-game and demonsrtates that such solutions satisfy coalitional monotonicity and population monotonicity.

The solution of an equation f(x)=γ given by an increasing function f on an interval I and right-hand side γ, can be approximated by a sequence calculated according to Newton’s method. In this article, global convergence of the method is considered in the strong sense of convergence for any...