We analyse the question of optimal taxation in a dual economy, when the government is concerned about the distribution of labour income. Income inequality is caused by the presence of sunk capital investments, which creates a .good jobs. sector due to the capture of quasi-rents by trade unions....

We analyse the question of optimal taxation in a dual economy, when the policy-maker is concerned about the distribution of labour income. Income inequality is caused by the presence of sunk capital investments, which creates a "good jobs" sector due to the capture of quasi-rents by trade...

We analyse the question of optimal taxation in a dual economy, when the government is concerned about the distribution of labour income. Income inequality is caused by the presence of sunk capital investments, which creates a ‘good jobs’ sector due to the capture of quasi-rents by trade...

We analyze unionized firms' incentives to outsource intermediate goods production to foreign (low-cost) subcontractors. Such outsourcing leads to increased wages for the remaining in-house production. We find that stronger unions, which imply higher domestic wages, reduce incentives for...

We examine how a merger affects wages of unionized labour and, in turn, the profitability of a merger under Cournot competition in differentiated products. If unions are plant-specific, we find that a merger is more profitable than in a corresponding model with exogenous wages. In contrast to...

We examine how a merger a ffects wages of unionized labour and, in turn, the profitability of a merger under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. If unions are plant-specific, we find that a merger is more profitable than in a corresponding model with exogenous wages. In contrast to the...

We examine how a downstream merger affects input prices and, in turn, the profitability of such a merger under Cournot competition with differentiated products. Input suppliers can be interpreted as ordinary upstream firms, or trade unions organising workers. If the input suppliers are...

We analyze unionized firms’ incentives to outsource intermediate goods production to foreign (low-cost) subcontractors. Such outsourcing leads to increased wages for the remaining in-house production. We find that stronger unions, which imply higher domestic wages, reduce incentives for...

We find that trade unions have a rational incentive to oppose the adaption of labour-saving technology when labour demand is inelastic and unions care much for employment relative to wages. Trade liberalisation typically increases trade union technology opposition. These conclusions are reached...