This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 is an introduction. section we review the existing research on (sequential) pooled auctions. section 3m formalized our model of simultaneous ooled suctions while in the section 4 we derive the equilibrium bidding strategies. Section 5 contains the...

We study sequential auctions of stochastically identical objects and endogenous participation.

We prove the equilibrium existence of incomplete markets economies with an uncountable number of states without any special hypothesis on endowments by the introduction of bankruptcy.

This paper investigates a simultaneous discrete public good provision game with incomplete information. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider both contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded if the project is not completed, while in...

In this paper, we study an auction where bidders only know the number of potential applicants.

This paper presents a surprising example. It shows that lattice theoretic properties in Mas-Colell's (1986) seminal work are relevant to the existence of equilibrium problem even when commodity space is finite dimensional. The paper provides an example of an economy with three commodities and...

We introduce the concept of inconsequential arbitrage and, in the context of a model allowing short-sales and half-lines in indifference surfaces, we prove that inconsequential arbitrage is sufficient for existence of equilibrium. With a slightly stronger condition of local nonsatiation than...

We prove equilibrium existence for economies with separable utilities, uncountable state space, incomplete markets without any special assumptions on endowments

We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a competitive revelation principle for contracting games in which several principals compete for one privately informed agent. In particular, we show that given any profile of incentive...