Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive population dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model mutation rates as...

Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model these mutation rates as endogenously...

We analyze a model of repeated bilateral trade with moral hazard, where the quality of goods received can differ from the quality despatched due to deterioration during transportation. Since the sender does not observe the quality of good received and the receiver does not observe the quality...

We review the burgeoning literature on two-sided markets focusing on the different definitions that have been proposed. In particular, we show how the well-known definition given by Evans is a particular case of the more general definition proposed by Rochet and Tirole. We then identify the...

This indispensable Handbook examines both economic and legal aspects of competition policy and industrial organization. It provides a scholarly review of the state of the art regarding economic theory, empirical evidence and standards of legal evaluation. The book aims primarily at furthering...

We describe the evolution of the structure of the Dutch electricity market since the E-Act 1998 that implemented the first EU Electricity Directive. The initial idea of the government was to combine liberalization in supply with concentration in generation, with the attempt to create a national...

This paper considers a class of repeated signalling games to gain some intuitive insights into the effects and the desirability of modelling players in a dynamic game of incomplete information as being obstinate in the sense that their beliefs satisfy a support restriction. We demonstrate that...

We consider a linear price setting duopoly game with di®erentiated products and determine endogenously which of the players will lead and which will follow. While the follower role is most attractive for each firm, we show that waiting is more risky for the low cost firm so that, consequently,...

We consider a linear quantity setting duopoly game and analyze which of the players will commit when both players have the possibility to do so. To that end, we study a 2-stage game in which each player can either commit to a quantity in stage 1 or wait till stage 2. We show that committing is...