We evaluate the performance of an environmental market in a less developed country on the basis of the experiences of the particulate matter control program of Santiago, Chile. We find that grandfathering the permits has created economic incentives for incumbent sources to more readily declare...

Despite the increasing interest in the use of emissions trading for pollution control, empirical evidence reduces to a few experiences in the US. This paper studies the “"emission-offsets trading program”" established since 1992 to control particulate in Santiago-Chile. While the program is...

Over the last 12 years, Chile has been very successful in attracting private participation in the provision of public infrastructure. Private capital has gone into road infrastructure, ports, and airports all over the country in the form of concessions. The aim of the 1991 Concession Law and...

Heavy outdoor pollution is found in developing country cities such as Jakarta, Katowice, Mexico City, and Santiago. But most epidemiological studies of dose-response relationships between particulate air pollution (PM10) and premature deaths are from Western industrial nations. This study of...

The authors estimate dose-response functions for respiratory disease among children based on data from public clinics in Santiago. They find that respiratory disease among Santiago s children is significantly affected by air pollution, measured as PM10 (small dust particles). The effect, for...

During the last two decades, the Chilean banking industry has experienced a high concentration due to several mergers between its institutions. Among the reasons ar- gued for these consolidations, a potential for substantial gains in e¢ ciency is claimed. Recent studies suggest that the Chilean...

A tradeable permits market is said to be efficient when all affected firms trade permits until their marginal costs equal the market price. Detailed firm-level data are generally required to perform such an efficiency test, yet such information is rarely available. If firms face a declining...

We consider a market for storable pollution permits in which a large agent and a fringe of small agents gradually consume a stock of permits until they reach a long-run emissions limit. The subgame-perfect equilibrium exhibits no market power unless the large agent’s share of the initial stock...

I study the design of environmental policies for a regulator that has incomplete information on firms’ emissions and costs of production and abatement (e.g., air pollution in cities with numerous small polluting sources). Because of incomplete information on emissions, there is no policy that...

This paper studies firms’ incentives to invest in environmental R&D under different market structures (Cournot and Bertrand) and environmental policy instruments (emission standards, taxes, tradeable permits and auctioned permits). Because of market strategic effects, R&D incentives vary...