The incidence and duration of work-absence spells for a sample of Swedish blue-collar workers in 1990 and 1991 are analyzed using the Kaplan-Meier non-parametric estimator, discrete-time hazard regression as well as stratified Cox regression. We focus on the effect of economic incentives, i.e.,...

We study how economic incentives affect labor force exit through different income security programs, old-age pensions as well as income taxes in Sweden. We use the option value for staying in the labor force as a measure of economic incentives and estimate an econometric model for the choice of...

The incidence and duration of work absence spells for a sample of Swedish blue collar workers in 1991 are analyzed using the Kaplan-Meier estimator, discrete time hazard regression as well as stratified Cox regression. The main interest is directed towards the effect of economic incentives. The...

The effect of economic variables on the probability of being absent is studied using panel data for a sample of 1,056 blue collar workers covering day-to-day data for the time period of one year (1991), in all 365,565 observations. Also, the effect of a reform in the sickness insurance on worker...

We estimate the effects of the implementation of a compulsory work injury insurance in Sweden in 1978 on compensating wage differentials. This involves two steps. First, we investigate if there are compensating wage differentials on the Swedish labor market and second, we assess if these were...

The effect of economic incentives on absenteeism in Sweden is examined. Based on a utility funcion, frequently used in labour supply studies, absenteeism is modelled as an individual day-to-day decision. Implications of compensating wage differentials and efficiency wage hypotheses are...

The effect of economic incentives on worker absenteeism is analyzed using panel data on work absence behavior for each day during 1990 and 1991 (i.e. 730 observations in the time dimension) for a representative sample of 1,396 Swedish blue collar workers. During the observed time period, a major...

We use a reform of Sweden’s sickness insurance system as a source of exogenous variation to analyse the presence of moral hazard. As a result of the reform, the replacement level was reduced from 90 percent of forgone earnings to 65 percent for the first three days; to 80 percent between day 4...

We analyze the effect of economic incentives on worker absenteeism, using panel data on work absence for 1990 and 1991 with a sample of 1,396 Swedish blue-collar workers. During this period Sweden implemented major reforms of both its national income replacement program for short-term sickness...