This paper questions the equidistribution assumption for the random effects in a frequency risk model. Two models are presented, which use parametric and nonparametric links between the variance of the random effect and frequency risk. They are estimated on a Spanish automobile insurance...

This paper presents a case study of a portfolio of individual long-term insurance contracts sold by a Spanish mutual company. We describe the risk levels, the rating structure and the implied cross-subsidies on a portfolio of policies providing health, life and long-term care insurance. We show...

This paper presents statistical models which lead to experience rating in insurance. Serial correlation for risk variables can receive endogeneous or exogeneous explanations. The interpretation retained by actuarial models is exogeneous and reflects the positive contagion usually observed for...

A captive is an insurance or reinsurance company established by a parent group to finance its own risks. Captives mix internal risk pooling between the business units of the parent group and risk transfer towards the reinsurance market. We analyse captives from an optimal insurance contract...

This paper analyses the rationale of long-term care (LTC) insurance purchasing from a statistical analysis of insurance data and a life cycle model. We make a short survey of the pros and cons of LTC insurance purchase. Then risk distributions in the occurrence and duration dimension are...

This article proposes a computer-intensive methodology to build bonus-malus scales in automobile insurance. The claim frequency model is taken from Pinquet, Guillén, and Bolancé (2001). It accounts for overdispersion, heteroskedasticity, and dependence among repeated observations. Explanatory...

This paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral hazard. We first show that experience rating implies negative occurrence dependence under moral hazard: individual claim intensities decrease with the number of past claims. We then show that dynamic...

A standard problem of applied contracts theory is to empirically distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard. We show that dynamic insurance data allow to distinguish moral hazard from dynamic selection on unobservables. In the presence of moral hazard, experience rating implies...