The utopia point of a multicriteria optimization problem is the vector that specifies for each criterion the most favourable among the feasible values. The Euclidean compromise solution in multicriteria optimization is a solution concept that assigns to a feasible set the alternative with...

A new class of cooperative multicriteria games is introduced which takes into account two different types of criteria: private criteria, which correspond to divisible and excludable goods, and public criteria, which in an allocation take the same value for each coalition member. The different...

In this note we use the Shapley value to define a valuation function. A valuation function associates with every non-empty coalition of players in a strategic game a vector of payoffs for the members of the coalition that provides these playersÂ’ valuations of cooperating in the coalition....

In this paper we propose a method to associate a coalitional interval game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower and upper values of finite two-person zero-sum games. We axiomatically characterize this new method. As an intermediate step, we provide some axiomatic...

I survey the literature on network formation in situations where the possible gains from cooperation of coalitions of agents are modeled by a coalitional game. I discuss the models that appear in the literature and their predictions on the networks that will be formed according to various...

We define a concept of status equilibrium for local public good economies. A status equilibrium specifies one status index for each agent in an economy. These indices determine agentsÂ’ cost shares in any possible jurisdiction. We provide an axiomatic charaterization of status equilibrium...