We provide an axiomatization of expected equally-distributed equivalent-utility social welfare functions in the context of Harsanyiʼs impartial observer theorem. For this family of social welfare functions, we show what additional axiom is necessary and sufficient for the observer to exhibit...

We confront two common objections to Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem; one to do with 'fairness', and the other to do with different individuals' having different attitudes toward risk. Both these objections can be accommodated if we drop the reduction axiom; in particular, if we...

Savage motivated his Sure Thing Principle by arguing that, whenever an act would be preferred if an event obtains and preferred if that event did not obtain, then it should be preferred overall. The idea that it should be possible to decompose and recompose decision problems in this way has...

In recent years there has been a growing theoretical, experimental and empirical challenge to Expected Utility Theory, the overwhelmingly dominant paradigm for modeling decision-making under risk. However, there has been relatively little work done in providing easily parameterized alternatives...

What is the relationship between an agent's attitude towards information, and her attitude towards risk? If an agent always prefers more information, does this imply that she obeys the independence axiom? We provide a substitution property on preferences that is equivalent to the agent...

We examine a dynamic model of English auctions with independent private values. There is a single object for sale and it is not possible for the seller, who has a value of zero for the object, to commit not to sell in the future if a sale is not accomplished today. The seller may be able to...

We compare the Skiadas approach with the standard Savage framework of choice under uncertainty. At first glance, properties of Skiadas "conditional preferences" such as coherence and disappointment seem analogous to similarly motivated notions of decomposability and disappointment aversion...

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a dynamically consistent agent always to prefer more informative signals (in single-agent problems). These conditions do not imply recursivity, reduction or independence. We provide a simple definition of dynamically consistent behavior, and we...