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Let X be a convex subset of a locally convex topological vector space, let U⊂X be open with U¯ compact, let F:U¯→X be an upper semicontinuous convex valued correspondence with no fixed points in U¯∖U, let P be a compact absolute neighborhood retract, and let ρ:U¯→P be a continuous...
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Levy (2013) presents examples of discounted stochastic games that do not have stationary equilibria. The second named author has pointed out that one of these examples is incorrect. In addition to describing the details of this error, this note presents a new example by the first named author...
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The effect of perturbing a parameter—comparative statics—is, of course, a familiar and important issue in economic analysis. Perfection of a single Nash equilibrium (Selten (1975)) is defined by requiring that at least some perturbations in a given class give rise to perturbed...
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In a setting where agents have quasi-linear utilities over social alternatives and a transferable commodity, we consider three properties that a social choice function may possess: truthful implementation (in dominant strategies); monotonicity in differences; and lexicographic affine...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043007
We study a model of sequential bargaining in which, in each period before an agreement is reached, the proposerʼs identity is randomly determined, the proposer suggests a division of a pie of size one, each other agent either approves or rejects the proposal, and the proposal is implemented if...
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A decision scheme (Gibbard, 1977) maps profiles of strict preferences over a set of social alternatives to lotteries over the social alternatives. A decision scheme is weakly strategy-proof if it is never possible for a voter to increase expected utility (for some vNM utility function consistent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010577888
In the model there are two types of financial auditors with identical technology, one of which is endowed with a prior reputation for honesty. We characterize conditions under which there exists a "two-tier equilibrium" in which "reputable" auditors refuse bribes offered by clients for fear of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985719