We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game...

We study the length of agreements in a market in which infinitely-lived firms contract with agents that live for two periods. Firms differ in the expected values of their projects, as do workers in their abilities to manage projects. Worker effort is not contractible and worker ability is...

We consider a market where firms hire workers to run their projects and such projects differ in profitability. At any period, each firm needs two workers to successfully run its project: a junior agent, with no specific skills, and a senior worker, whose effort is not verifiable. Senior workers...

We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game...

We consider a market where firms hire workers to run their projects and such projects differ in profitability. At any period, each firm needs two workers to suc- cessfully run its project: a junior agent, with no specific skills, and a senior worker, whose effort is not verifiable. Senior...

We study collaborative and noncollaborative projects that are supported by government grants. First, we propose a theoretical framework to analyze optimal decisions in these projects. Second, we test our hypotheses with a unique data set containing academic publications and research funds for...

We develop a two-sided matching model to analyze collaboration between heterogeneous academics and firms. We predict a positive assortative matching in terms of both scientific ability and affinity for type of research, but negative assortative in terms of ability on one side and affinity in the...

We study university projects and research collaboration projects with industry that are supported by government grants. First, we propose a theoretical model to analyze optimal decisions in these ventures. Second, we test our theoretical results with a unique dataset containing academic...

We develop a two-sided matching model to analyze collaboration between heterogeneous academics and firms. We predict a positive assortative matching in terms of both scientific ability and affinity for type of research, but negative assortative in terms of ability on one side and affinity in...