We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

We present a simple voting environment with three candidates where the Condorcet winner exists. Under plurality rule, the derived game has a stable set where such a candidate is elected with probability one. However, no stable set of the approval game elects the Condorcet winner with positive...

Il saggio propone alcune riflessioni sulle culture politiche, giuridiche e sociologiche vicine al pensiero delle numerose e ostinate ricerche militanti di Bruno Trentin. Non si tratta di "saggiare" l’indiscutibile attualità dell’imponente corpus teorico trentiniano, quanto di partire dalle...

This paper illustrates on two examples the use of some multivariate statistical analysis methods for describing profiles of preferences. The first example is the Social Choise and Welfare council election of 1999 and the second is a school-case fictious one. The school case example shows how...

This paper considers electoral competition between two office-motivated parties and one voter, in the presence of two alternative policies and under imperfect information. The theory of refinements of Nash equilibrium predicts the outcome of this three-player game: both parties faithfully use...