Clements (2004) makes the following two claims: (i) unlike direct network effects, increases in the size of the market do not, in the case of indirect network effects, make standardization more likely, but (ii) indirect network effects are associated with excessive standardization. We show in...

Clements (2004) makes the following two claims: (i) unlike direct network effects, increases in the size of the market do not, in the case of indirect network effects, make standardization more likely, but (ii) indirect network effects are associated with excessive standardization. We show in...

In this paper we address the possibility of horizontal foreclosure in markets for complementary services (software) where the consumption value of durables (hardware) depends on the availability of software. Horizontal foreclosure occurs when a hardware firm merges with a software firm and the...

In this paper, the authors examine the software provision decision of software firms. The provision decision by software firms determines the value and, hence, the market share of competing hardware technologies. The authors show how the provision decision by software firms determines whether...

In this Paper we consider the economics of platform competition in telecommunications. Platform competition occurs when different, sometimes incompatible, technologies compete to provide telecommunications services to end-users. Battles between competing technologies have been an important...

The authors develop a model in which the benefit of language acquisition is increasing in the number of individuals who speak the language. This gives rise to a network externality and, if language acquisition is costly, the language acquisition decisions by individuals may be inefficient. If...