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This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information games and studies the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information. A set of equilibria of a complete information game is robust if every incomplete information game where payoffs are almost always given...
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This paper considers an exchange economy under uncertainty with asymmetric information. Uncertainty is represented by multiple priors and posteriors of agents who have either Bewley's incomplete preferences or Gilboa-Schmeidler's maximin expected utility preferences. The main results...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005422908
We present a model of incomplete information games with sets of priors. Upon arrival of private information, each player "updates" by the Bayes rule each of priors in this set to construct the set of posteriors consistent with the arrived piece of information. Then the player uses a possibly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385291
This paper considers a two agent model of trade with multiple priors. First, we characterize the existence of an agreeable bet on some event in terms of the set of priors. It is then shown that the existence of an agreeable bet on some event is a strictly stronger condition than the existence of...
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In a beauty contest framework, welfare can decrease with public information if the precision of private information is exogenous, whereas welfare necessarily increases with public information if the precision is endogenous with linear costs of information acquisition. The purpose of this paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010770509