We show how capital structure is influenced by the strength of shareholder rights. Our empirical evidence shows an inverse relation between leverage and shareholder rights, suggesting that firms adopt higher debt ratios where shareholder rights are more restricted. This is consistent with agency...

This study explores the impact of corporate takeover defences on the extent of earnings management in the US. Theoretically, it is not obvious whether takeover defences alleviate or exacerbate earnings management. Four well-known corporate takeover defences are examimed: blank check preferred...

Because of concentrated ownership stakes, board composition and longer-investment horizons, founding-family controlled firms provide an interesting setting for examining issues relating to governance and control. Anderson and Reeb (2003a, b, 2004), find that the founding-family controlled...

We explore the role of powerful CEOs on the extent of risk-taking, using Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer's (2011) CEO pay slice (CPS). Based on more than 12,000 observations over 20 years (1992-2012), our results reveal a nonmonotonic association. In particular, relatively less powerful CEOs exhibit...

We examine the impact of corporate governance quality on the extent of analyst coverage. The evidence based on nearly 3000 firms indicates that more analysts are likely to cover firms with weaker corporate governance. In particular, as corporate governance quality falls by one SD, analyst...

type="main" <p>We show that a firm's CSR policy is significantly influenced by the CSR policies of firms in the same three-digit zip code, an effect possibly due to investor clienteles, local competition, and/or social interactions. We then exploit the variation in CSR across the zip codes to...</p>

We show that firms located geographically close to one another share a similar probability of having staggered boards (or classified boards), an effect probably due to investor clientele, local competition, and social interactions. We then exploit the variation across the zip codes in the...

We investigate whether CEO compensation is influenced by the strength of shareholder rights. Our evidence reveals that CEOs of firms where shareholder rights are weak obtain more favorable compensation. It is also found that higher CEO pay is associated with a higher degree of potential...

We use agency theory to investigate the influence of CEO dominance on variation in capital structure. Due to agency conflicts, managers may not always adopt leverage choices that maximize shareholders’ value. Consistent with the prediction of agency theory, the evidence reveals that, when the...