Workers will not pay for general on-the-job training if contracts are not enforceable. Firms may if there are mobility frictions. Private information about worker productivities, however, prevents workers who quit receiving their marginal products elsewhere. Their new employers then receive...

Workers will not pay for general on-the-job training if contracts are not enforceable. Firms may if there are mobility frictions. Private information about worker productivities, however, prevents workers who quit receiving their marginal products elsewhere. Their new employers then receive...

Workers will not pay for general on-the-job training if contracts are not enforceable. Firms may if there are mobility frictions. Private information about worker productivities, however, prevents workers who quit receiving their marginal products elsewhere. Their new employers then receive...

Overseas employment has become more commonplace, and remittances have increased in similar proportions. For poor countries, remittances often substantially influence domestic expenditures and real exchange rates. We study overseas employment, remittances and domestic underemployment in a simple...

We build and test a model of how the growth of public jobs with wage premiums may help to explain the high and potentially inefficient level of urbanization in LDCs. Public jobs comprise about 40% of non- agricultural employment in LDCs, and have frequently offered substantial wage premiums. The...

This paper shows that the effect of job instability on the socioecon omic structure of British unemployment is less than usually thought: groups with a high frequency of unemployment often have high prob abilities of entering unemployment should turnover occur, and not hig h turnover; high...