Several recent papers show that different combinations of taxes and subsidies can achieve the social optimum for green design and household waste management when there are various market failures. This note shows that such policy flexibility exists only if all relevant actions by individual...

This paper provides a comprehensive model of household waste management policy with three interacting parties: a firm, a household and an environmental regulator. The regulator chooses the environmental tax, the household waste collection charge, monitoring of illegal waste disposal by the...

This paper uses an optimal contract approach to examine the issue of compliance monitoring in agri-environmental policy when the farmer is risk neutral and risk averse. The environmental agency chooses monitoring accuracy and payments for farmer's (non-)compliance. With a risk-neutral farmer, an...

In recent years reducing the amount of waste generated by households has become an important policy issue in industrialised economies. It is no longer acceptable to discard waste without concern for environmental and natural resource issues. In an effort to reduce household waste various policy...

This paper uses an optimal contract approach to examine the issue of compliance monitoring in agri-environmental policy when the farmer is risk neutral and risk averse. The environmental agency chooses monitoring accuracy and payments for farmer's (non-)compliance. With a risk-neutral farmer, an...

This paper provides a comprehensive model of household waste management policy with three interacting parties: a firm, a household and an environmental regulator. The regulator chooses the environmental tax, the household waste collection charge, monitoring of illegal waste disposal by the...