We extend the well-known spatial competition model (d'Aspremont et al., 1979) to a continuous time model in which two firms compete in each instance. Our focus is on the entry timing decisions of firms and their optimal locations. We demonstrate that the leader has an incentive to locate closer...

We study sequential merger incentives under presence of product differentiation. Two sets of firms produce closely related goods, whereas each set produces more differentiated goods. Merger incentives under product differentiation are found to be stronger for two firms producing closely related...

We apply a spatial model that includes both circular-city and linear-city models as special cases to the analysis of location-quantity model in mixed oligopoly. We find that the equilibrium pattern continuously moves from that of the circular-city to that of the linear-city and that the...

We consider a two-stage location-price Hotelling model where the consumers can only buy from one direction, as presented by Kharbach (2009, Economics Bulletin). We show that the equilibrium outcome derived by Kharbach does not constitute a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

This paper examines a two-period moral hazard model with an inequality-averse agent. We show how the agent's past performance will help the principal to relax incentive compatibility constraints and how the existence of an inequality aversion of the agent affects a level of wage in each period...

We consider the issue of optimal licensing from the viewpoint of an external public licensor maximizing social welfare. Our principal findings are as follows. Fee licensing is always at least as good as royalty licensing for the public licensor. For small innovations, there exists a subgame...

We study the price and welfare effects of a merger of firms producing unidirectional complements: a firm is producing a product (called an optional good) that is valuable only if it is consumed with the other product (called a base good) produced by another firm. Under the assumption that there...

This paper provides two characterizations of the retailer’s markup relative to the manufacturer’s markup in vertical relationships with homogeneous manufacturers and homogeneous retailers. We first show that retailer’s relative markup is equal to the ratio of the retail pass-through to the...