We explore the economic linkage between farms and neighboring communities using primary data collected from a state-wide cross section of 461 dairy farms. Empirical results implicate not only farm characteristics such as size, operator tenure and ethnicity but also the characteristics of the...

This research focuses on developing a biannual net revenue forecasting model for hog producers based on Monte Carlo simulation of the joint distribution of hog, corn and soybean meal price series. The relative forecasting power of historical volatility, implied volatility and GARCH-based...

Using data collected by the U.S. Department of Energy we test how price and environmental marketing and labeling affects respondents' uncertainty about product attributes and about their purchase intentions.

A model of vertical quality differentiation is used to analyze the introduction of continuous and binary labeling in a market for credence goods with process attributes under autarky and free trade. The results indicate that continuous labeling increases welfare under autarky and free trade so...

The costs of corn- and soybean-based feeds compose a substantial proportion of the variable costs faced by both mainstream and emergent confined livestock producers. This research develops a method to provide a joint distribution of prices of corn and soybean meal at a future time. Black's 1976...

When products are differentiated and quality is highly subjective (e.g., fashion or art), novel (e.g., a new feature), or difficult to verify prior to purchase (e.g., credence attributes), consumers may turn to price as a signal of quality. Products containing genetically modified (GM)...

Using experimental economics, we compare the efficiency and welfare effects of tournament and fixed standards contracts. Our findings suggest that economic agents are generally better off under fixed standard contracts unless they face substantial common shocks. Administrators of contracts...

Experimental economics is used to compare tournaments (T) and fixed performance contracts (F) when agents have heterogeneous costs. Our primary findings were: (1) There is no statistical difference in average pooled effort (effort by high ability and low ability subjects are pooled together to...