This paper empirically investigates directors' ownership in the mutual fund industry. Our results show that, contrary to anecdotal evidence, a significant portion of directors hold shares in the funds they oversee. Ownership patterns are broadly consistent with an optimal contracting...

Using both a linear regression method and a probability-based method, we find that on average, analysts place larger than efficient weights on (i.e., they overweight) their private information when they forecast corporate earnings. We also find that analysts overweight more when issuing...

This paper identifies a limit to arbitrage that arises because firm value is endogenous to the exploitation of arbitrage. Trading on private information reveals this information to managers and improves their real decisions, enhancing fundamental value. While this feedback effect increases the...

This paper documents frequent attempts by activist arbitrageurs to open-end discounted closed-end funds, particularly after the 1992 proxy reform which reduced the costs of communication among shareholders. Open-ending attempts have a substantial effect on discounts, reducing them, on average,...

This paper identifies a limit to arbitrage that arises from the fact that a firm's fundamental value is endogenous to the act of exploiting the arbitrage. Trading on private information reveals this information to managers and helps them improve their real decisions, in turn enhancing...

type="main" <title type="main">ABSTRACT</title> <p>This paper analyzes the effects of public information in a perfect competition trading model populated by asymmetrically informed short-horizon investors with different levels of private information precision. We first show that information asymmetry reduces the amount of...</p>