We empirically estimate the substitutability of fixed and mobile services for telecommunications access using a large, U.S. household survey1 conducted over the period 1999-2001. We take advantage of telephone price subsidy programs for low-income households to identify large, exogenous changes...

We empirically estimate the substitutability of fixed and mobile services for telecommunications access using a large, US household survey conducted over the period 2000-2001. Estimated cross-price elasticities confirm that second fixed line and mobile services are substitutes for one another....

This paper provides an economic analysis of the proper role of copyright protection for computer software. We begin by identifying key economic conditions in the software market. Besides its public good characteristics, software generates network externalities through increased sales of programs...

This paper assesses the private and social incentives for disjoint networks to interconnect under various ownership structures. Terms of interconnection are derived for a noncooperative equilibrium. We find that networks mutually profit from interconnection when it creates new services that did...

This paper borrows Dupuit's parable of a bridge so as to reexamine the problem of selecting and financing public investment projects in a dynamic and strategic setting. A regulator imposes a price ceiling, and a firm makes a sunk investment each period. Three simple examples reveal the...

This paper borrows Dupuit's parable of a bridge so as to reexamine the problem of selecting and financing public investment projects in a dynamic and strategic setting. A regulator imposes a price ceiling, and a firm makes a sunk investment each period. Three simple examples reveal the...

We consider the difficulty of achieving efficient prices and investments when returns on a public utility's projects are vulnerable to opportunistic ratemaking. We model the long-term relationship between a firm and its regulator as a time-dependent supergame in which the regulator sets price...

This paper compares one-part and two-part pricing in a discrete-continuous choice model, providing more extensive welfare results than prior literature. Under two-part pricing, firms may set fixed fees with or without `unit-price commitment,' where the lack of unit-price commitment is consistent...