Monday IPOs occur infrequently and have higher mean initial returns than those issued on other days. The latter result is not a product of outliers or penny stocks and remains after controlling for factors related to IPO underpricing. The Monday effect is generally robust across time, but during...

Standard models of adverse selection in insurance markets assume policyholders know their loss distributions. This study examines the nature of equilibrium and the equilibrium value of information in competitive insurance markets where consumers lack complete information regarding their loss...

Lease financing is a well-recognized mechanism for reducing the agency costs of debt. This study examines whether firms that attempt to control the agency costs of equity through strong governance structures, including Chief Executive Officer compensation alignment and board structure, are more...

We examine a market with observably heterogeneous risks and a government sponsored guaranty fund and consider whether it is optimal to form a single insurer or separate insurers for each consumer type. Given the economic environment, pooling never dominates the formation of separate insurance...

The size distribution of mutual property-liability insurers has a larger proportion of relatively small companies than the size distribution of stock property-liability insurers. Small mutuals are unlikely to offer risk-sharing advantages over conventional insurance, so these firms must offer...

We examine the effect of background risk on competitive insurance markets with moral hazard. If policy-holders have non-negative prudence, then background risk does not decrease effort and, when effort increases, expands the set of feasible policies. However, the effect of background risk on...

The analysis considers an insurance market with adverse selection where individuals' loss distributions may differ with respect to both the frequency and severity of loss. We show that the combination of deductibles and coinsurance can be used to sort rationed policyholders. Because of their...