We analyze the optimal location choice of a monopolistic firm that operates two platforms on a two-sided market. We show that the optimal platform locations are equivalent to the one-sided benchmark if both sides are either restricted to single- or multi-homing. In the mixed case (one side...

This paper investigates whether a price-concentration relationship can be found on local cinema markets in Germany. First, we test a model of monopolistic pricing using a new set of German micro data and find no significant difference in admission prices on monopoly and oligopoly markets. In a...

We use a set of German micro data to study the relationship between mainstream and art house movie theaters. We find that both types of cinema have a significant price effect within their own group, but there is no significant price effect between the two types. Furthermore, we provide an...

We make a case for price-increasing competition on “competitive bottleneck” two-sided markets. We argue that demand interrelation might be sufficient to cause either no observable price effect of competition or price-increasing competition. Under price equality, total demand on both market...

The empirical relationship between market concentration and prices has been well established for a long time and for numerous industries. Recently itwas confirmed for the USmovie theater industry. This paper investigates, whether such a price-concentration relationship can be found on local...

We use a set of German micro data to study the relationship between mainstream and art house movie theaters. We find that both types of cinema have a significant price effect within their own group, but there is no significant price effect between the two types. Furthermore, we provide an...

The observed two-part tariff price structure (consisting of a lump-sum price and a linear marginal price) for drinking water in Germany does not reflect the cost structure reported in the literature. Recovering marginal costs from a sample of 251 German counties, we see that there are positive...

The present paper provides a descriptive analysis of the second-degree price discrimination problem on a monopolistic two-sided market. By imposing a simple two-sided framework with two distinct types of agents on one of its market sides, it will be shown that under incomplete information, the...

The paper provides an analysis of the second-degree price discrimination problem on a monopolistic two-sided market. In a simple framework with two distinct types of agents on market side 1, we show that under incomplete information the extent of platform access for high-demand agents is...

In explaining economic phenomena, economic analysis concentrates on selected influences and fixes the host of other factors under a ceteris paribus clause. This view, which goes back to Alfred Marshall (1842-1924), is developed in the first part of the book. Aggregation is viewed as a particular...