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Raiffa (1961) has suggested that ambiguity aversion will cause a strict preference for randomization. We show that dynamic consistency implies that individuals will be indifferent to ex ante randomizations. On the other hand, it is possible for a dynamically-consistent ambiguity averse...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883466
This paper studies how updating affects ambiguity attitude. In particular we focus on generalized Bayesian updating of the Jaffray–Philippe sub-class of Choquet Expected Utility preferences. We find conditions for ambiguity attitude to be the same before and after updating. A necessary and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010987822
This paper investigates the dynamic consistency of CEU preferences. A decision maker is faced with an information structure represented by a fixed filtration. If beliefs are represented by a convex capacity, we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for dynamic consistency is that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005592908
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753344
In Ghirardato et al. (2004) [7], Ghirardato, Macheroni and Marinacci propose a method for distinguishing between perceived ambiguity and the decision-maker[modifier letter apostrophe]s reaction to it. They study a general class of preferences which they refer to as invariant biseparable. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009249199
This paper studies how updating affects ambiguity-attitude. In particular we focus on the generalized Bayesian update of the Jaffray-Phillipe sub-class of Choquet Expected Utility preferences. We find conditions for ambiguity-attitude to be the same before and after updating. A necessary and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010539152
If players' beliefs are strictly nonadditive, the Dempster-Shafer updating rule can be used to define beliefs off the equilibrium path. We define an equilibrium concept in sequential two-person games where players update their beliefs with the Dempster-Shafer updating rule. We show that in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005384749
Goeree & Holt (2001) observe that, for some parameter values, Nash equilibrium provides good predictions for actual behaviour in experiments. For other payoff parameters, however, actual behaviour deviates consistently from that predicted by Nash equilibria. They attribute the robust deviations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005453737
This article considers the impact of ambiguity in strategic situations. It extends the existing literature on games with ambiguity‐averse players by allowing for optimistic responses to ambiguity. We use the CEU model of ambiguity with a class of capacities introduced by Jaffrray and Philippe...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011006323
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005678352