The traditional wisdom holds that the benefits of a decentralized channel structure arise from downstream competitive relationships. In contrast, Arya and Mittendorf (2007) showed that the value of decentralization can also arise from upstream interaction when the downstream firm conveys...

The literature has established two kinds of entry bias in imperfectly competitive markets. First, free entry may lead to excessive entry relative to the socially optimal level. Second, free entry may lead to the wrong technology (type of firm) in the market compared to the socially optimal...

The authors attempt to clarify the concepts of, and the link between, fixed costs and sunk costs. They argue that the root for possible confusion between fixed costs and sunk costs is the inconsistency in defining the term fixed costs. They define fixed costs uniformly as the costs that are...

This note extends the simultaneous-move endogenous technology choice model of Mills and Smith (1996) in two directions. First, expanding consideration to when the technology set is sufficiently convex, we find that the likelihood for asymmetric equilibrium in technology choice does not expand...

We follow the framework in Arya and Mittendorf's 2011 Rand Journal of Economics paper but extend their analysis by investigating supplier(s)' equilibrium choices of disclosure or confidentiality regarding their contract terms with the downstream retailers. In the case of a common supplier, we...

We study mass customization in a duopoly game in which the firms' products have different qualities. Whether customization choices are made simultaneously or sequentially is endogenously determined. Specifically, the customization stage of the game involves two periods. Each firm either selects...