We consider two-sided many-to-many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may …

We consider two-sided many-to-many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may …

We consider two-sided many-to-many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may …

-to-one matching markets, (a) filled positions depend on the particular equilibrium that is reached and (b) welfare levels are not …This paper studies many-to-one matching markets where each student is assigned to a hospital. Each hospital has … possibly multiple positions and responsive preferences. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching …

We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game … induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling. …

This paper studies many-to-one matching markets where each student is assigned to a hospital. Each hospital has … possibly multiple positions and responsive preferences. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching …) showed that there can be unstable equilibrium outcomes. We prove that any stable matching can be obtained in some equilibrium …

In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in … uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …

We show that the full version of the so-called "rural hospital theorem" generalizes to many-to-many matching problems …

In an infinite-horizon economy with matching frictions, I study the efficient assignment between workers of different …

-to-many matching where agents on both sides of the market have separable and substitutable preferences. …