In this article, we generalize the position value, defined by Meessen (1988) for the class of deterministic communication situations, to the class of generalized probabilistic com- munication situations (G ́ Gomez et al. (2008)). We provide two characterizations of this new allocation rule....

We provide a generalization of the position value (Meessen 1988) that allows players to benefit from transfers of worth by investing in their communication links. The player who invests the most in a communication link obtains a compensation from the second one. We characterize this new...

We survey axiomatic results concerning the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)). This marginalist allocation rule results from an axiomatic study of the class of coalitional games. Shapley (1953) specifies a list of desirable properties of solutions for this class of games, and he shows that the...

We introduce a new allocation rule, called the sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest TU-games. We provide two axiomatic characterizations for this allocation rule. The first one uses the classical property of component efficiency plus an edge deletion property. The second...

We investigate assignment of heterogeneous agents in trees where the allocation rule is given by the permission value. We focus on efficient hierarchies,namely those, for which the payoff of the top agent is maximized. For additive games, such hierarchies are always cogent, namely, more...

We survey axiomatic results concerning the Shapley value [Shapley, 1953]. This marginalist allocation rule results from an axiomatic study of the class of coalitional games. Several authors have enriched Shapley?s axiomatic study and have provided new characterizations of this allocation rule....

We consider the problem of sharing water from a river among the group of countries located along it. The benefit of each country depends on the amount of water it consumes. An allocation of the water is efficient when it maximizes the total benefits of the countries. The problem of finding a...

We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to...

The river sharing problem deals with the fair distribution of welfare resulting from the optimal allocation of water among a set of riparian agents. Ambec and Sprumont [Sharing a river, J. Econ. Theor. 107, 453–462] address this problem by modeling it as a cooperative TU-game on the set of...

The goal of this article is to generalize the position value (Meessen, 1988) in order to take into account the negotiation powers of players on the allocation of the worth. These negotiation powers are formalized via a weight scheme similar to the one defined by Haeringer (2006). We define and...