Showing 1 - 10 of 17
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005500112
This paper considers a two-stage project which requires investments to be made by different agents, who have career concerns, at each stage. The principal needs to decide whether the project should be continued or not after the first-stage outcome is realized. The principal can either keep the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743950
This paper analyzes the allocation of decision-making authority when the principal has reputation concerns. The principal can either keep the authority, or delegate it to the agent, who has better information. An outside evaluator who forms the principal's reputation cannot observe who makes the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008545990
A budget needs to be distributed among jurisdictions through bargaining in the legislature. Using a simple three-player, three-period Baron and Ferejohn [Baron, D.P., Ferejohn, J.A., 1989. Bargaining in legislatures. American Political Science Review 83 (4), 1181-1206] style legislative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008521179
This paper analyzes the allocation of decision-making authority when the principal has reputation concerns. The principal can either keep the authority and consult the agent (an expert), or delegate the authority to the agent; however, the outside evaluator cannot observe the allocation of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130229
To investigate players' incentives in coalition formation, we consider a legislative bargaining game with asymmetric information about time preferences. The force that does not exist in usual bargaining games with unanimity is that due to majority rule, if a player signals himself as the patient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342329
This paper considers a delegated common agent who produces a public good with private information regarding his cost. We show that truthful strategies are not optimal for principals, and that the agent enjoys some rent in equilibrium. It is not always that all principals make contributions: the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010629600
This paper considers a delegated common agent who produces a public good with private information regarding his cost. We show that truthful strategies are not optimal for principals, and that the agent enjoys some rent in equilibrium. It is not always that all principals make contributions: the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005110641
We develop an input-output methodology to estimate how Chinese exports affect the country’s total domestic value added (DVA) and employment for 1995 and 2002. Total DVA generated by exports is obtained by subtracting all direct and indirect imported intermediate goods from the gross value of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980404
Executive Order S-1-07, the Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) (January 18, 2007), calls for a reduction of at least 10 percent in the carbon intensity of California’s transportation fuels by 2020. It instructed the Secretary of the California Environmental Protection Agency to coordinate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011130789