The literature on self-control problems has typically put forth models that imply behavior that is consistent with the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference. We argue that when choice is the outcome of some underlying internal conflict, the resulting choices may not be perfectly consistent across...

We study an individual who faces a dynamic decision problem in which the process of information arrival is unobserved by the analyst. We elicit subjective information directly from choice behavior by deriving two utility representations of preferences over menus of acts. One representation...

We study an individual who faces a dynamic decision problem in which the process of information arrival is unobserved by the analyst. We elicit subjective information directly from choice behavior by deriving two utility representations of preferences over menus of acts. The most general...

Preference for flexibility arises inherently in sequential decision making. However, a majority of the literature has limitations to capture a changing preference for flexibility across time in the sense that such an attitude is independent of past actions. This study incorporates the histories...

We study an individual who faces a dynamic decision problem in which the process of information arrival is unobserved by the analyst. We elicit subjective information directly from choice behavior by deriving two utility representations of preferences over menus of acts. One representation...

We study an individual who faces a dynamic decision problem in which the process of information arrival is unobserved by the analyst. We derive two utility representations of preferences over menus of acts that capture the individuals uncertainty about his future beliefs. The most general...

The final step in the proof of Proposition 1 (p.311) of Mukerji and Tallon (2003) may not hold in generalbecause $\varepsilon0$ in the proof cannot be chosen independently of $w,z$. We point out by a counterexample that the axioms they impose are too weak for Proposition 1. We introduce a...

This paper provides an axiomatic foundation for a particular type of preference shock model called the random discounting representation where a decision maker believes that her discount factors change randomly over time. For this purpose, we formulate an infinite horizon extension of [E. Dekel,...