Competitive bidding for electric generating capacity is becoming based on economic dispatch rather than the PURPA "must-take" norm. Incorporating economic dispatch into bidding requires different price scoring procedures. The "avoided cost" of a dispatchable project is determined by the energy...

Scaling up renewable energy, such as wind and solar, goes hand-in-hand with the expansion of transmission infrastructure. The richest solar and wind renewable energy sites are often located far away from consumption centers or existing transmission networks. Unlike fossil fuel-based power...

Electricity capacity markets work in tandem with electricity energy markets to ensure that investors build adequate capacity in line with consumer preferences for reliability. The need for a capacity market stems from several market failures. One particularly notorious problem of electricity...

The most efficient global climate policy is to price carbon. The Kyoto-Copenhagen agenda was intended to do this with a system of international cap and trade. We view these negotiations as a game in which countries choose their quantity targets based on self interest. Like the analogous...

In economic, technical and political terms, the security of energy supply is of the utmost importance for Europe. Alongside competition and sustainability, supply security represents a cornerstone of the EU’s energy policy, and in times of rising geopolitical conflict plays an...

This book responds to the opening up of electricity markets to competition, which has completely changed the nature of power generation. The building of new generation and transmission capacity and the setting of the energy mix between nuclear, gas and renewable resources are mainly left to...

The Kyoto summit initiated an international game of cap and trade. Unlike a national policy, the essence of this game is the self-selection of national emission targets. This differs from the standard global public-goods game because targets are met in the context of a global carbon market. This...

Global cap and trade equalizes the price of emissions and leads to efficient abatement across countries, but sets the abatement level inefficiently low. It is set too low, because the global cap is the sum of individual country targets set on the basis of self-interest. The efficiency of a...

The international game of cap and trade begins when countries choose their quantity targets, which are largely selected according to self interest. The analogous public-goods game, in which countries choose their abatement levels, has an uncooperative outcome. Compared to that, the Nash...

This paper compares market designs intended to solve the resource adequacy (RA) problem, and finds that, in spite of rivalrous claims, the most advanced designs have nearly converged. The original dichotomy between approaches based on long-term energy contracts and those based on short-term...