We focus in this paper on the effects of court errors on the optimal sharing of liability between firms and financiers, as an environmental policy instrument. Using a structural model of the interactions between firms, financial institutions, governments and courts we show, through numerical...

Seeing the firm as a nexus of activities and projects, we propose a characterization of the firm where variations in the market price of risk should induce adjustments in the firm's portfolio of projects. In a setting where managers disagree with respect to what investment maximizes value,...

We characterize a firm as a nexus of activities and projects with their associated cashflows. Production and operations activities and real risk management activities distribute cashflows over states of nature and time periods, leading to a transformation possibility frontier similar to a...

We characterize a firm as a nexus of activities and projects with their associated cash flow distributions across states of the world and time periods. We propose a characterization of the firm where variations in the market price of risk induce adjustments in the value-maximizing combination of...

This paper makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy. Economists' quasi-unanimous preferences for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered. First, we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism literature and provide an incomplete...