We construct a model to analyze the willingness of Health Authorities to reach agreements with private hospitals to have some of their public sector patients treated there. When physicians are dual suppliers, we show that a problem of cream-skimming arises and reduces the incentives of the...

We deal with a cost allocation problem arising from sharing a medical service in the presence of queues. We use a standard queuing theory model in a context with several medical procedures, a certain demand of treatment and a maximum average waiting time guarantee set by the government. We show...

We develop a principal-agent model to analyze how the behavior of a physician in the public sector is affected by his activities in the private sector. We show that the physician will have incentives to over-provide medical services when he uses his public activity as a way of increasing his...

We consider an economy where public hospitals are capacity-constrained, and we analyse the willingness of health authorities to reach agreements with private hospitals to have some of their patients treated there. When physicians are dual suppliers, we show that a problem of cream-skimming...

In this paper we provide a theoretical foundation for the Porter hypothesis in a context of quality competition. We use a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation where firms simultaneously choose the environmental quality of the good they produce (which can be either high or low) and,...

This paper presents a thorough analysis of the issue of dual job holding among physicians. As the causes and implications of this phenomenon may well depend on the specific form of dual practice under consideration, we first introduce a typology of dual practice in the health sector based on the...

Internationally, there is wide cross-country heterogeneity in government responses to dual practice in the health sector. This paper provides a uniform theoretical framework to analyze and compare some of the most common regulations. We focus on three interventions: banning dual practice,...

We deal with a cost-allocation problem arising from sharing a medical service in the presence of queues. We use a standard queuing theory model in a context of several medical procedures, a certain demand for treatment and a maximum average waiting-time guaranteed by the government. We show that...

We develop a principal-agent model in which the health authority acts as a principal for both a patient and a general practitioner (GP). The goal of the paper is to investigate the relative merits of gatekeeping and non-gatekeeping systems and to analyze the role of the quality of patient...