Virtually all U.S. states have now created voluntary cleanup programs (VCPs) offering liability relief and other incentives for responsible parties to remediate contaminated sites. We use a duration model to analyze participation in Oregon’s program. In contrast to previous VCP research, we...

Virtually all U.S. states have now created voluntary cleanup programs (VCPs), offering liability relief and other incentives for responsible parties to remediate contaminated sites. We use a multinomial probit model to analyze participation in Oregon’s two VCPs. In contrast to previous VCP...

Voluntary agreements (VAs) negotiated between environmental regulators and industry are increasingly popular. However, little is known about whether they are likely to be effective in developing and transition countries where local and federal environmental regulatory capacity is typically weak....

Tuberculosis is the most important infectious cause of adult deaths after HIV/AIDS in low- and middle-income countries. This paper evaluates the economic benefits of extending the World Health Organization's DOTS Strategy (a multi-component approach that includes directly observed treatment,...

Price caps, while widely touted, are less commonly implemented. Most incentive schemes involve profit sharing and are thus variants of sliding-scale regulation. I show that, relative to price caps, some degree of profit sharing always increases expected welfare. Numerical simulations show that...

This paper compares the performance of two prominent non-Bayesian regulatory mechanisms: Sappington and Sibley's (1988) Incremental Surplus Subsidy (ISS) and Hagerman's (1990) refinement of the Vogelsang-Finsinger (1979) mechanism. The two mechanisms are shown to induce identical, non-zero...

We extend the economic theory of regulation to allow for strategic self-regulation that preempts political action. When political "entry" is costly for consumers, firms can deter it through voluntary restraints. Unlike standard entry models, deterrence is achieved by overinvesting to raise the...

We examine the applicability of price-cap mechanisms to the regulation of gas distribution company rates for gas supply and transportation services. Although distribution companies will continue to be regulated for the foreseeable future, we argue that a hybrid of price and profit regulation of...

In many markets governments set minimum quality standards while some sellers choose to compete on the basis of quality by exceeding them. Such ‘high-quality’ strategies often win public acclaim, especially when ‘environmental friendliness’ is the dimension along which firms are...