We estimate the technical efficiency gains of introducing individual quotas (IQs) in fisheries. Our estimates are based on two samples of vessels, considering a potential self-selection bias and controlling for quality changes in landings induced by the IQ system. The results suggest that the...

We study the compliance behavior of artisanal fishermen in central-southern Chile. Our empirical analysis explores the role of individual morality and perception of legitimacy as determinant factors in the decision to violate regulations. The results indicate that both individual moral standing...

This paper analyzes the wage gap between non-indigenous peoples and Mapuches in Chile. This gap is broken down into endowment and discriminatory components. Participation and wage equations are estimated by gender and ethnic group and the results are controlled for sample selection bias. The...

Territorial Use Rights (commonly known as TURFs in the literature) consists in the allocation of fishing rights to individuals and/or groups to fish in certain geographical locations. A requisite for these communities to be granted fishing rights is the formulation of a management and...

We consider the pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant with a model of optimal, possibly firm-specific, emissions taxes and their enforcement under incomplete information about firms' abatement costs, enforcement costs, and pollution damage. We argue that optimality requires an enforcement...

We analyze the cost of enforcing a system of firm specific emissions standards vis a vis a transferable emissions permit system in the context of complete and incomplete information. We also examine the optimality of a transferable emissions permit system when abatement costs and enforcement...