The existing literature has shown that less political uncertainty, or more central bank transparency, may worsen macroeconomic performance by raising the nominal wage. We extend this analysis to a non-bayesian framework, where there is some aversion to ambiguity. We show that the result found in...

We consider a two-player global game where creditors, who finance some investment project, have to decide whether to roll over their loans or not. We use a non-Bayesian approach where creditors exhibit some aversion to ambiguity. We show that an increase in ambiguity reduces the perceived...

On étudie et compare deux cas d'incertitude qui ont abouti à des arguments de référence en faveur de moins d'activisme de la politique économique. L'un , comme dans Brainard (1967), où cette incertitude porte sur l'effet global de la politique; et l'autre, comme dans Friedman (1960) pour la...

We use a non-Bayesian approach to uncertainty which allows for both optimism and pessimism in a simple global game, where each signal can exhibit a bias which is ambiguous. We underline a symmetry between two models of financial crises: a liquidity crisis model, and a currency crisis model. We...

According to the literature, in an expectations-augmented Phillips curve model, opacity is always preferred to transparency on central bank forecasts. By modelling the private sector's behavior explicitly, we show that transparency reduces the shocks. Consequently, transparency can be preferred.

We consider a model where the central bank faces a credibility problem in its announcements, but also cares about its credibility and, therefore, wants to make truthful announcements. We show that, although the central bank would be able to perfectly transmit its information to the private...

We use a non-Bayesian approach to uncertainty, where “ambiguity” is taken into account, in order to analyze the issue of central bank transparency, and we underline that the use of such an approach may greatly change the results. We reconsider a specific argument against transparency found...

In a global game, larger ambiguity is shown to decrease the amount of coordination each player perceives. Consequently, small uncertainty tends to select the Pareto dominated equilibrium of the game without uncertainty. Implications for models of financial crises are drawn.

Dans un modèle à deux pays où on considère le policy-mix en réponse à des chocs, on examine la question de savoir si le gain résultant de la coordination des politiques budgétaires entre pays est plus élevé en union monétaire qu'en change flexible. On montre tout d'abord que...