We study optimal tax policies in a life-cycle economy with risky human capital and permanent ability differences, where both ability and learning effort are private information of the agents. The optimal policies balance several goals: redistribution across agents, insurance against human...

We run experiments with a stag hunt and bargaining coordination game. Using a between-subjects design, we vary the identity of the opponent between someone of the same culture or a different culture. The idea is to see whether cultural norms or identity play a part in coordination decisions. We...

This paper studies the impact of ambiguity in the best shot and weakest link models of public good provision. The models are ?rst analysed theoretically. Then we conduct experiments to study how ambiguity affects behaviour in these games. We test whether subjects? perception of ambiguity differs...

We study the role of village-level religious fragmentation on intra- and inter-group cooperation in India. We report on data on two-player Prisoners’ Dilemma and Stag Hunt experiments played by 516 Hindu and Muslim participants in rural India. Our treatments are the identity of the two players...

We investigate a new macroprudential policy in a DSGE model with fi?nancial frictions. As Gertler, Kiyotaki and Queralto (2012), we propose to subsidize bank equities. However, our tax rate is different from their policy. The tax rate in our macroprudential policy is proportional to capital...

In this paper, we consider a model where producers set their prices based on their prediction of the aggregated price level and an exogenous variable, which can be a demand or a cost-push shock. To form their expectations, they use OLS-type econometric learning with bounded memory. We show that...

We propose a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) phenomenon in a general model that permits non-smooth preferences and feasible sets and corner solutions for welfare maximisation. These conditions pertain to the relationship between the sets of...

We study the impact of capital and labor taxation in an economy where couples bargain over the intrahousehold allocation. We present a life cycle model with heterogeneous individuals and incomplete nancial markets. Drawing from the literature of the collective framework of household behavior, we...

We analyse a simple model of dynamic moral hazard in which there is a clear and tractable trade-off between static and dynamic incentives. In our model, a principal wants an agent to complete a project. The agent undertakes unobservable effort, which affects in each period the probability that...

This paper analyses a two-player game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits.At least one of the arms is risky in the sense that it may not yield a lumpsum payoff. There is payoff externality between the players and they differ in their ability to learn across the risky arm. Either...