Showing 1 - 10 of 11
We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing strategic games: average testing. In this procedure each player sticks to her current strategy if it yields a payoff that exceeds her average payoff by at least some fixed ε0; otherwise she chooses a strategy at random. We consider generic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043052
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005752800
R. J. Aumann and J. H. Drèze (2008) define a rational expectation of a player i in a game G as the expected payo of some type of i in some belief system for G in which common knowledge of rationality and common priors obtain. Our goal is to characterize the set of rational expectations in terms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005752820
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827960
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005708193
Consider a finite, normal form game G in which each player position is occupied by a population of N individuals, and the payoff to any given individual is the expected payoff from playing against a group drawn at random from the other positions.  Assume that individuals adjust their behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009320223
In 1995, Aumann showed that in games of perfect information, common knowledge of rationality is consistent and entails the back- ward induction (BI) outcome. That work has been criticized because it uses "counterfactual" reasoning|what a player "would" do if he reached a node that he knows he...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008562714
We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing strategic games: average testing. In this procedure each player sticks to her current strategy if it yields a payoff that exceeds her average payoff by at least some fixed \epsilon 0; otherwise she chooses a strategy at random. We consider...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008853829
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009149568
The logic of backward induction (BI) in perfect information (PI) games has been intensely scrutinized for the past quarter century. A major development came in 2002, when P. Battigalli and M. Sinischalchi (BS) showed that an outcome of a PI game is consistent with common strong belief of utility...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010714082