This paper contributes to the finance-growth literature by examining the political economy origins of some of the most successful financial markets in Europe and Asia. It provides historical evidence from London, Amsterdam and Hong Kong that highlights the essential role played by the government...

This paper contributes to the finance-growth literature by examining the political economy origins of some of the most successful financial markets in Europe and Asia. It provides historical evidence from London, Amsterdam and Hong Kong that highlights the essential role played by the government...

Summary We provide historical evidence from London, Amsterdam and Hong Kong which highlights the essential role played by governments in kick-starting financial development. In the cases of London and Amsterdam, the emergence of financial markets was a by-product of the rise of large trading...

The paper reviews recent literature on the relationship between finance and growth, highlighting areas where we need to know more. The paper argues that institutions, such as financial regulation, have a first-order effect on financial development and growth, and that their effectiveness could...

We present a theoretical model of moral hazard and adverse selection in an imperfectly competitive loans market that is suitable for application to Africa. The model allows for variation in both the level of contract enforcement (depending on the quality of governance) and the degree of market...

We show that previous results suggesting that government ownership of banks is associated with lower long run growth rates are not robust to adding more “fundamental” determinants of economic growth. We also present new cross-country evidence for 1995- 2007 which suggests that, if anything,...

Using a suitably modified locational model of banking, we examine the influence of institutions, such as deposit contract enforcement, in explaining the share of government owned banks in the banking system. We present cross-country evidence suggesting that institutional factors are relatively...

We put forward a plausible explanation of African financial underdevelopment in the form of a bad credit market equilibrium. Utilising an appropriately modified IO model of banking, we show that the root of the problem could be unchecked moral hazard (strategic loan defaults) or adverse...

Using a suitably modified locational model of banking, we examine the influence of institutions, such as deposit contract enforcement, in explaining the share of government owned banks in the banking system. We present cross-country evidence suggesting that institutional factors are relatively...