With the experience of the sequence of UMTS auctions held worldwide in mind, we consider a situation where firms participate in license auctions to compete in an aftermarket. It is known that when a monopoly right is auctioned, auctions select the bidder that is least risk-averse. This firm will...

This discussion paper led to a publication in the <I>Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics</I> (2010). Vol. 166, issue 2, pages 286-298. <P> A simultaneous pooled auction with multiple bids and preference lists is a way to auction multiple objects, in which bidders simultaneously express a...</p></i>

This discussion paper led to a publication in the <I>Regional Science and Urban Economics</I> (2005). Vol. 35(6), pages 700-714.<P> This paper develops a model for multi-store competition between firms. Using thefact that different firms have different outlets and produce horizontally differentiated...</p></i>

This discussion paper led to a publication in <A href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02334.x/abstract">'The Economic Journal'</A>, 120(549) 1319-44.<P>This paper considers a government auctioning off multiple licenses to firms who compete in a market after the auction. Firms have different costs, and cost efficiency is private information at the auction...</p></a>

This discussion paper led to a publication in the <I>Journal of Risk and Insurance</I>. Vol. 72(1), pages 45-59.<P> We take a dynamic perspective on insurance markets under adverseselection and study a generalized Rothschildand Stiglitz model where agents may differ with respect to theaccidental...</p></i>

We take a dynamic perspective on insurance markets under adverse selection and study a generalized Rothschild and Stiglitz model where agents may differ with respect to the accidental probability and their expenditure levels in case an accident occurs. We investigate the nature of dynamic...

This paper develops one possible argument why auctioning licenses to op- erate in an aftermarket may lead to higher prices in the aftermarket compared to a more random allocation mechanism. Key ingredients in the argument are differences in firms' risk attitudes and the fact that future market...

A simultaneous pooled auction with multiple bids and preference lists is a way to auction multiple objects, in which bidders simultaneously express a bid for each object and a preference ordering over which object they would like to get in case they have the highest bid on more than one object....

This paper considers a government auctioning off multiple licenses to firms who compete in a market after the auction. Firms have different costs, and cost efficiency is private information at the auction stage and the market competition stage. If only one license is auctioned, standard results...