En adoptant le point de vue du régulateur, nous cherchons à répondre aux questions suivantes : quel est le rôle des AV aujourd'hui dans un contexte où les firmes s'engagent dans la RSE ? RSE et AV sont-ils des substituts ou des compléments du point de vue de la puissance publique ? Quelle...

The paper analyzes the efficiency of extended producer responsibility (EPR) for waste management. We consider a vertically differentiated duopoly where endogenous market quality affects waste disposal costs. Each producer has to meet a take-back requirement that forces it to collect and treat...

[fre] Les Accords Volontaires entre l’État et les entreprises sont utilisés par la puissance publique depuis au moins vingt ans. Or depuis quelques années, les firmes s’engagent de plus en plus à améliorer leur performance environnementale ou sociale de manière purement unilatérale....

The paper analyzes the efficiency of extended producer responsibility (EPR) for waste management. We consider a vertically differentiated duopoly where endogenous market quality affects waste disposal costs. Each producer has to meet a take-back requirement that forces it to collect and treat...

The paper analyzes the efficiency of extended producer responsibility (EPR) for waste management. We consider a vertically differentiated duopoly where endogenous market quality affects waste disposal costs. Each producer has to meet a take-back requirement that forces it to collect and treat...

The paper analyzes the efficiency of extended producer responsibility (EPR) for waste management. We consider a vertically differentiated duopoly where endogenous market quality affects waste disposal costs. Each producer has to meet a take-back requirement that forces it to collect and treat...

Does self-regulation improve social welfare? We develop a policy game featuring a regulator and a firm that can unilaterally commit to better environmental or social behavior in order to preempt future public policy. We show that the answer depends on the set of policy instruments available to...

Are Corporate Social Responsibility and Voluntary Agreements Complementary ? Voluntary agreements between regulators and firms have been in use for at least two decades. In recent years, however,firms have tended to commit to better environmental or social behavior in a more unilateral fashion....

Does self-regulation improve social welfare? We develop a policy game featuring a regulator and a firm that can unilaterally commit to better environmental or social behavior in order to preempt future public policy efforts. We show that the answer depends on the set of policy instruments...

Les auteurs étudient un duopole sur un marché où les produits sont différenciés horizontalement. Les firmes se font concurrence en catalogue dans le sens où elles choisissent simultanément un produit et un prix. Ils montrent alors qu'il n'existe pas d'équilibre de Nash en stratégie pure...