We show in a public goods experiment on three continents that conditional cooperation is a universal behavioral regularity. Yet, the number of conditional cooperators and the extent of conditional cooperation are much higher in the U.S.A. than anywhere else.

In hypothetical scenarios involving two groups (nations or groups of workers), subjects voted on three proposals: one helped group A (their group), one helped B, and one helped both groups, more than the average of the first two but less than their maximum. When subjects voted for one proposal,...

We show in a public goods experiment on three continents that conditional cooperation is a universal behavioral regularity. Yet, the number of conditional cooperators and the extent of conditional cooperation are much higher in the United States than anywhere else.

Risk and reliability dominate water supply discussions in the arid western United States due to increasing demand and finite, weather-dependent supply. Water markets have evolved in this region so agencies could meet this growing demand. In a few instances, water agencies turned to contractual...

In a best-shot public good, where the provision level is determined by the highest contribution instead of the sum of all contributions, there is potential for waste and underprovision due to coordination failure. These failures are exacerbated when agents are identical because there is no focal...

Using a best-worst ranking exercise we compare the inferences made by consumers regarding the nutritional value and healthiness of fluid milk and soymilk beverages under several combinations of three labeling regimes: front label, back label ( including the nutritional information panel), and an...

We endowed consumers with conventional apples and auctioned local, organic and organic-local apples to elicit consumers’ valuation and the response to two experimental treatments: scientific information and taste. For both labels, which participants valued as partial substitutes, positive WTP...

This paper examines the political difficulty of enacting welfare-enhancing environmental taxes. Using referenda in a market experiment with externalities, we investigate the effect of trial periods on the acceptability of two theoretically equivalent Pigouvian tax schemes. While implementing...