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Although a punishment can be applied only once, the threat to punish can be repeated several times. This is possible because when parties comply, the punishment is not applied and can thus be used to support a new threat. We refer to this feature of sticks as the "multiplication effect." The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008675445
Tort law is generally considered to be an instrument that improves incentives. Yet many people and groups (including firefighters and police officers) enjoy some form of immunity. I show that those who enjoy immunity typically externalize the precaution costs to some degree. I analyze an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010632982
This study shows that the effects of judgment proofness on precaution depend on whether the injurer can reduce the probability of the accident, the magnitude of the harm, or both. Different legal solutions to the problem are examined: punitive damages, average compensation, undercompensation,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582106
Judgment proof injurers can be expected to take less than optimal precaution, as they bear only a part of the accident loss. However, it has been showed that under certain conditions the judgment proof problem can lead to overprecaution. We argue that overprecaution can never occur in magnitude...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086892
Sharing rules have a filtering effect on violations: they prevent the most harmful violations and let the least harmful ones occur. We show the conditions under which the filtering effect improves social welfare and argue that this may explain why, in most areas of the law, sharing rules are, in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005725413
Eric Posner (2003) has argued that (contract) law and economics has failed to produce clear policy recommendations because its theoretical results are usually inconclusive and empirical data on the parameters are usually unavailable. Legislators and courts, however, cannot wait to make decisions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010665586
An annullable penalty is a sanction that is applied unless monitoring takes place and the agent is found non-shirking. An annullable bonus is a bonus that the agent receives unless he has been monitored and found shirking. Annullable penalties and bonuses stand in contrast with normal penalties...
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