Voting theory has always focused on mechanism design, but this paper shows that voting theory is also a useful tool in the field of preference representation. Both the lexicographic order on n-dimensional Euclidean space and the threshold of detectable difference relation are pairwise majority...

This paper takes voting theory out of the realm of mechanism design and studies elections as tools for representing preferences: every preference relation on a set of n elements is the outcome of pairwise voting by approximately 2 log2n voters with transitive preferences. Results like this one...

We assign a probabilistic evaluation to a firm as a measure, in the form of a probability distribution over [0,1], of the quality of the firm’s products. When two firms compete to develop a new product, a prospective investor can use the two evaluations to determine which firm is likely to...

In two-sided matching markets, stability can be costly. We define social welfare functions for matching markets and use them to formulate a definition of the price of stability. We then show that it is common to find a price tag attached to stability, and that the price of stability can be...