We argue that many strategic interactions are chosen by, rather than imposed upon, agents. The endogeneity of the implicit game substantially alters the incentive structure faced by agents. If agents can refuse to play a game and instead seek a different partner, then it becomes in their...

Laboratory and field experiments have grown significantly in prominence over the past decade. The experimental method provides randomization in key variables therefore permitting a deeper understanding of important economic phenomena. This path-breaking volume provides a valuable collection of...

Recent experimental evidence from dictator games suggests that proposers take money from receivers when taking is an option, and that many proposers are reluctant to play the game. This paper proposes a behavioral model with two components: a choice correspondence that depends on the endowed...

When prescribers are not price sensitive, prescriptions segment the duopoly market and the unique dominant strategy equilibrium has both firms setting the monopoly price. When some prescribers are price sensitive, manufacturers use mixed strategies but still earn positive expected profit.

Recent experimental evidence suggests that standard expected utility is violated in a wide variety of ways: losses are treated differently from gains, people are generally risk averse over gains and risk loving over losses, fanning and curvature effects exist, problem representation matters, and...

This paper considers an environmental regulatory agency that sets both the emissions standard and the enforcement parameters in contrast to the usual treatment in which the agency sets only one of the two. It is shown that if the agency’s budget is sufficiently small, it sets the strictest...