Competitive behaviors such as outbidding one's rivals may be countered by the rivals' threat of mutually destructive objections. In an Arrow-Debreu model of production economies with firms privatized by property rights, we model such hindered competitive behaviors as a coalition's attempt to...

In production economies, the extent to which non-equilibria are blocked depends on the allocation of control rights among shareholders, because a blocking coalition's resources are affected by the firms it jointly owns with outsiders. We formulate a notion of blocking that takes such...

For different purposes, economists may use different topologies on types. We char- acterize the relationship among these various topologies. First, we show that for any general types, convergence in the uniform-weak topology implies convergence in both the strategic topology and the uniform...

We study the robustness of interim correlated rationalizability to perturbations of higher-order beliefs. We introduce a new metric topology on the universal type space, called uniform weak topology, under which two types are close if they have similar first-order beliefs, attach similar...

We study the robustness of interim correlated rationalizability to perturbations of higher-order beliefs. We introduce a new metric topology on the universal type space, called uniform weak topology, under which two types are close if they have similar first-order beliefs, attach similar...

Barelli [P. Barelli, On the genericity of full surplus extraction in mechanism design, J. Econ. Theory 144 (2009) 1320-1332] defines beliefs-determine-preferences (BDP) models and argues that BDP models are nongeneric in a topological sense. In this note, we point out some difficulties in...

Previous research has established that the predictions made by game theory about strategic behavior in incomplete information games are quite sensitive to the assumptions made about the players' infinite hierarchies of beliefs. We evaluate the severity of this robustness problem by...